ment to enquire into the battle summarised their view of what had been achieved by the combined attack which constituted the Nivelle scheme in the following words :—

" However this may be, if the offensive was far from obtaining the results hoped for, it is none the less true that it constituted a real *Positive* success for our armies. Under the achievements *of offensive* menace of its preparation the enemy refused to fight on a portion of his front and had evacuated 2,000 square kilometres of ground, thus setting free one-eighth part of the invaded territory. As for the attack itself, it had procured 55,000 prisoners, 800 guns, and 1,000 mitrailleuses.

Apart from this result as regards material, thanks to the rapid using up of the enemy's reserves, it cleared the Italian Front in the Trentino, got rid of all danger from the Russian Front and gave the initiative in the operations into our hands."

The French members had exaggerated very considerably the casualties sustained by the French Army. These extravagant estimates were *Casualties* commented upon very adversely by the *exaggerated* French Committee of Enquiry, and in dealing with the question of casualties they say :—

" As for the losses themselves which public opinion spoke of as particularly heavy,

they did not exceed those which had occurred in previous great battles. The battle of April, 1917, may be compared to the battle in Champagne in September, 1915. The object of both was to